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Weconsider ourselves to be rational beings.We feel that our choices, decisions, and actions
are selected from a ﬂexible array of possibilities, based upon reasons.When we vote for a
political candidate, it is because they share our views on certain critical issues. When we
hire an individual for a job, it is because they are the best qualiﬁed. However, if this is true,
why does an analysis of the direction of shift in the timbre of the voice of political candidates
during an exchange or debate, predict the winner of American presidential elections?Why
is it thatwhile only 3%of theAmerican population consists ofwhitemen over 6′4′′ tall, 30%
of the CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are white men over 6′4′′ tall? These are examples
of “instinctual biases” affecting or modulating rational thought processes. I argue that
existing theories of reasoning cannot substantively accommodate these ubiquitous, real-
world phenomena. Failure to recognize and incorporate these types of phenomena into
the study of human reasoning results in a distorted understanding of rationality.The goal of
this article is to draw attention to these types of phenomena and propose an “adulterated
rationality” account of reasoning as a ﬁrst step in trying to explain them.
Keywords: rationality, reasoning, Decision Making, evolutionary psychology, instincts, biases
Nature, Mr. Allnutt, is what we were put on this world to rise above.
–Katharine Hepburn to Humphrey Bogart in The African Queen
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The conception of man as a rational, thinking being, permeates
Western thought from (at least) Aristotle to present times. Our
behavior is explained by postulating beliefs and desires, and a
principle of “rationality,” that guides our pursuit of the latter in the
context of the former. My use of the term “rationality” is derived
from the philosophical literature,meaning roughly, deliberate rea-
son. (It does not imply a commitment to any normative standard,
as is the case in the psychology literature.) On this account ratio-
nality is goal directed behavior. It is simply a means to an end
and is ascribed to individual agents. It is a deliberate choice or
action that moves an organism closer to its goal in a manner con-
sistent with its knowledge and beliefs. A rational choice is not
simply a selection, it is a selection for a reason (Bermudez, 2002).
Perhaps themost signiﬁcant feature of a rational system is the exis-
tence of a “gap” between the stimulus and the response (Cassirer,
1944). The stimulus or antecedent condition is never causally suf-
ﬁcient to determine any speciﬁc choice or action. I will use the
term “reason-based” to refer to this general notion of rational-
ity. Reason-based choice is often contrasted with instinctual or
tropistic behavior, where there is no such gap and the antecedent
conditions are causally sufﬁcient for a course of action (Bermudez,
2002).
Consider the following example: when a youngmale lion chases
away an older male and takes over a pride, he proceeds to kill any
cubs the females may be nursing. How should we explain this
behavior? Does the lion sit down and reason thus: “these cubs do
not perpetuatemy genes. Theywill require the expenditure of con-
siderable resources to feed and defend. Providing these resources
to perpetuate someone else’s genes does not make evolutionary
sense. However, if I kill these cubs (which I surely can, without
harm to myself), the females will stop lactating and come into
heat again. I can then impregnate them with my sperm and then
they will bear my offspring. Then the resources of the pride can be
used to propagate my genes rather than someone else’s. Therefore,
it is reasonable to kill these cubs.”
If the lion did deliberate in this way, we would be justiﬁed in
saying his behavior, however, cruel, was rational. If he reasoned
thus, and did not kill the cubs, his behavior would be irrational.
But most of us do not believe that the lion has the ability to reason
in this manner. Most of us do not believe that the lion chooses
actions from a vast array of possible alternatives for reasons. His
behavior is compelled, in the context of particular environmen-
tal and developmental factors. Therefore, applying the label of
“rationality” (given the above deﬁnition) to explain this behavior
is both unnecessary and incorrect. The lion’s behavior is certainly
adaptive, but it is not rational or reason-based. It is explained by
appeals to instinctual or tropistic mechanisms (such as parental
investment parasitization prevention) that are triggered by causal
interactions between thematuration of speciﬁc internal structures
and environmental cues. Once the mechanisms are triggered, they
lead to a particular course of action.
Now consider the case of a man who partners with a woman
with young children from a previous partner. The man does not
typically kill the children, though it may be, arguably, adaptive
to do so. Why not? Presumably because he’s making a conscious
choice from a wide range of possibilities. He is not driven to an
inevitable action. He could choose not to get involved in this rela-
tionship and ﬁnd a woman without children. Perhaps he loves
the children. Perhaps he ﬁnds the woman so desirable that the
opportunity to have his own children with her is worth the price
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of expending some resources to raise her children from a previous
partner. Perhaps his overtures to women without children have
been unsuccessful. Whatever the reason, he is making a conscious,
rational/reason-based choice.
However, if this appeal to reason is adequate to explain the
behavior of the man, why is it the case that instances of child
abuse/mistreatment are much higher in the case of stepfathers
(and stepmothers) than biological fathers and mothers (Daly and
Wilson, 2005)?Why is it the case that, despite our convictions that
we vote for political candidates because they share our views on
certain critical issues, that a simple analysis of the direction of
shift in the timbre of the voice of candidates during an exchange
or debate, predicts the winner of American presidential elections
(Gregory and Gallagher, 2002)?Why is it the case that, despite our
beliefs that we hire individuals for jobs because they are the best
qualiﬁed, 30% of the CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are white
men over 6′4′′ tall, even though they represent only 3% of the
American population (Rauch, 1995)?
These are all examples of what wemight call“instinctual biases”
affecting our reasoning and decision-making processes (Buss,
2005). They are genuine, ubiquitous phenomena. But they are not
phenomena typically studied by cognitive psychologists interested
in human reasoning. Our current research programs either (1)
ignore these types of “biases” (Rips, 1994; Johnson-Laird, 2006);
(2) assume that they are cut from the same cloth as the conceptual
biases in the Linda problem (see below) and can be explained in
the same fashion (Evans and Over, 1996; Stanovich, 2004); (3)
focus on instinctual biases, but assume that is all there is to human
reasoning (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994b; Duchaine et al., 2001) or
(4) consider them to be social biases built on top of the cognitive
engine and as such do not inﬂuence the operation of that engine
(Berry, 2007).
Iwant to suggest that ignoring these phenomena excludesmuch
of what is interesting about human reasoning from our research
programs, and may, in fact, result in distorted theories of human
reasoning based upon incomplete data sets. Furthermore, if evolu-
tionary psychologists are correct, the effect of biological markers
such as dominance cues, facial attractiveness cues, waist to hip
ratios (in women), shoulder to waist ratios (in men), etc. are not
socially construed phenomena, but apply universally (Buss, 2005).
The two theories of reasoning best situated to account for these
phenomena are massive modularity theory (Cosmides and Tooby,
1994b) and dual mechanism theories (Sloman, 1996; Evans, 2003;
Stanovich, 2004). I argue that neither of these accounts can
adequately accommodate the phenomena and propose a banal
adulterated rationality account.
CONCEPTUAL SPACE OF THEORIES OF HUMAN REASONING
INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORY
Classical information processing theory holds that the cognitive
system is a general purpose information processing system, per-
haps with some specialized modules, for language and perceptual
processes (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984; Newell, 1990). In the con-
text of this framework there are several accounts of reasoning such
as mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 2006) and mental logic
theory (Braine, 1978; Rips, 1994). While there are signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between these two theories, in terms of the nature of the
representations and computations employed during logical rea-
soning, both postulate a mechanism that operates within the rules
of formal logic. These theories generally do not try to explain the
phenomenon of “instinctual biases” of interest here.
MASSIVE MODULARITY
There is a research program that explicitly sets out to account
for instinctual biases. Indeed, 20 years ago Cosmides and Tooby
(1994a) exhorted cognitive scientists not to be blind to the effect
of instincts (“instinct blindness”). With respect to reasoning, they
have worked largely with theWason card selection task (Cosmides,
1989; Fiddick et al., 2000). The Wason card selection task is a dis-
guised formof conditional inference. Four cards, corresponding to
the four forms of the conditional (modus ponens, modus tollens,
denying the antecedent, and afﬁrming the consequent) are placed
in front of the subject, along with the conditional rule. The basic
result is that switching from a rule with arbitrary content (e.g., “if
the letter on one side of the card is a vowel, then the number on the
other side must be even”) to a rule that embodies the structure of
some social contract (e.g., “if someone is drinking beer, then they
must be over 18 years of age”), increases performance accuracy
from the order of 6% to the order of 80% (Wason and Shapiro,
1971; Cox and Griggs, 1982). The explanation is that this dramatic
shift in performance is the result of the triggering of a “cheater
detection”module.
On the massive modularity account the mind is not a gen-
eral purpose information processing system, but rather consists
of 1000s of special-purpose modules selected for the adaptive
advantage they conferred upon our Pleistocene ancestors in solv-
ing problems speciﬁc to their environment, such as selecting
mates, leaders, and detecting cheaters (Pinker, 1997; Duchaine
et al., 2001). The modules are causally triggered by speciﬁc envi-
ronmental cues. In previous times we would have called these
modules instincts. Today we might liken them to the apps on our
smartphones (Kurzban, 2012). Like apps theywork relatively inde-
pendently, though they may have access to information generated
by other speciﬁc apps. For example, the app that I use to monitor
my walks has access to information from the GPS and the system
clock. It does not have (nor requires) access to the output of the
apps that I use to listen to audiobooks or track ﬂight arrivals. One
can of course imagine a greater degree of interdependence and
interaction among modules, but the main point is that there is
no general-purpose reasoning system that controls the selection
and triggering of individual modules. The selection and trigger-
ing are determined by direct causal links to speciﬁc environmental
cues. On a strong version of the account, it is claimed that our
notion of rationality (or general purpose reasoning) is illusory.
What we regard as “general purpose reasoning” is just the func-
tioning of numerous instinctual modules (Cosmides and Tooby,
1994b).
Several authors offer compelling critiques of the massive mod-
ularity account (Fodor, 2001; Over, 2002). I believe its greatest
strength is that it offers a potential solution to the intractable
problem of induction (or the frame problem) that plagues cog-
nitive psychology, albeit at the price of a tight causal coupling
between speciﬁc environmental cues and triggering of speciﬁc
modules. Its greatest weakness is that it cannot explain howwe can
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send a man to the moon and predict and investigate the existence
of the Higgs boson (because presumably nothing in the Pleis-
tocene environment of our ancestors would have selected for these
abilities).
But for present purposes, I will limit my concerns about mas-
sive modularity to its ability to explain the speciﬁc examples of
reasoning/decision-making with which I began. It is not clear that
the above examples can be explained just in terms of activation of
speciﬁc instinctive modules. One reason to doubt the ability of the
massive modularity model to explain the phenomenon of interest
is to note the differences in the response patterns, and the ability
of participants to reﬂect upon and justify their responses, in the
case of our examples and the Wason card selection task.
In the case of theWason card selection task, a shift in content to
a rule breaking scenario results in a shift in accuracy approaching
ceiling level, and one can plausibly argue that the shift in content
triggers something like a cheater detection module. However, this
does not seem to be the case for the examples in the introduc-
tion. For example, while instances of child abuse by stepparents
are signiﬁcantly greater than for biological parents, they do not
approach 80% (Daly andWilson, 2005). We will not typically vote
for a leader who intends to adversely affect our lives, despite the
presence of dominance cues. In hiring a doctor we would not
typically choose a tall, handsome, athletic man without a medi-
cal degree over a short, hunchbacked, pudgy man with a medical
degree. Therefore these phenomena cannot be explained just in
terms of an appeal to instinctual modules (as they can in the case
of the lion, and perhaps even theWason card selection task). Such
phenomena call for a blended response between instincts/modules
and some general purpose reasoning system.
There is also a discrepancy between the response/behavior and
the reason/explanation offered for the behavior. In the case of
the Wason card selection task, participants can typically articu-
late why they chose particular cards (in the familiar content or
cheater detection version). In the case where we are evaluating
two potential employees (or grad students) with similar views and
qualiﬁcations, if one exhibits high attractiveness cues, while the
other does not, we will often choose the attractive individual,
but when questioned, our explanation will not implicate these
cues. It will be in terms of the qualiﬁcations of the candidates,
even though there may be no material differences in these factors
(Dipboye et al., 1975; Langlois et al., 2000; Hosoda et al., 2003).
We will not be consciously aware of the effect of the attractiveness
cues on our reasoning/decision-making behavior. This again sug-
gests that there are at least two processes at work here, a conscious
general-purpose reasoning system that evaluates the qualiﬁcations
of the two candidates, and unconscious instinctual biases that
modulate the operation of the former system.
It may be tempting to draw parallels between our inability to
report on the causal efﬁcaciousness of instinctual biases and the
confabulation that split brain patients engage in when the verbal
left hemisphere is unaware of the choices made by the right hemi-
sphere. While there are some similarities, the dissimilarities may
be greater. Consider the following famous experiment (Gazzaniga,
1998): a split brain patient was presented with a picture of a winter
scene projected to the right hemisphere (left visual ﬁeld) and a pic-
ture of a chicken claw projected to the left hemisphere (right visual
ﬁeld). The patient must then select two related pictures, one pic-
ture with each hand, from an array of other pictures. The patient’s
left hand points to a shovel (because the right-hemisphere, con-
trolling that hand has seen a snow-covered winter scene) and the
right-hand points to a chicken (because the left hemisphere, con-
trolling that hand, has seen the chicken claw). When the patient is
asked to explainwhy his left hand (guided by the right hemisphere)
is pointing to the shovel, the left hemisphere (dominant for lan-
guage) has no access to the information about the winter scene
seen by the right hemisphere. But instead of responding “I don’t
know” the patient responds by noting that the shovel is required
to clean the chicken coop.
The similarity lies in the fact that in both cases, the ver-
bal explanation for the behavior cannot causally account for the
behavior. The dissimilarity is that the explanation offered by the
left hemisphere of the split brain patient is a complete post hoc
confabulation. It simply is not relevant to explaining the behav-
ior. In the case of instinctual biases, we are not “confabulating”
in the same sense because the conscious explanation that we offer
(e.g., “this applicant has a degree from University of Waterloo”)
is usually causally relevant. It cannot explain the complete pat-
tern of the data, but it may be a relevant part of the causal
story.
DUAL MECHANISM THEORIES
There is a research program that acknowledges the necessity
of a general-purpose reasoning system and also explicitly sets
out to account for various reasoning biases. These dual systems
accounts of reasoning contrast heuristic/intuitive (System 1) pro-
cesses with formal (System 2) processes (Sloman, 1996; Evans,
2003; Stanovich, 2004). This is becoming a widely accepted dis-
tinction and seems to have an underlying neuropsychological basis
(Goel and Dolan, 2003; Goel, 2007). The critical feature of this
paradigm is that while there is a logical/formal response to the
task, in some conditions it is inhibited and bypassed by subjects’
background knowledge and beliefs. An example is provided by the
famous Linda Problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983):
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations.
Which statement is most likely?
(a) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement
(b) Linda is a bank teller
The effect is that many intelligent individuals will choose the
conjunction (a) as more likely than one of the conjuncts (b). Their
rationale is that the conjunct (b) by itself does not seem sufﬁcient
for someone with Linda’s background. The conjunction (a) in
addition contains a conjunct that seems more appropriate given
the background description of Linda. The usual explanation for
the“irrational” response is that overall (a) is more“representative”
of Linda than (b) (even though a conjunction cannot be more
likely than either conjunct)1. This has led to a distinction between
1The phenomenon disappears if one of the conjuncts is “Linda is active in the
feminist movement.” or if the conjunction is “Linda is a bank teller and is 43 years
old.”
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formal processes and heuristic/intuitive processes (Evans, 2003;
Stanovich, 2004).
This is a genuine, important psychological phenomenon.
Some dual mechanism theorists have argued that these heuristic
responses represent primitive, low-level instinctual biases that we
share with pigeons and rats (Evans and Over, 1996). This is simply
a mistake. The bias exhibited in the Linda problem is a very high
level, conceptual bias based upon language and our knowledge of
the world. Note that while heuristic responses may be considered
irrational, in sense of violating normative logic, [though this is a
moot point (Politzer and Noveck, 1991; Gigerenzer, 2007; Goel,
2008)], both responses are clearly reason-based, as I am using
the term here. There are sensible psychosocial expectancy reasons
for why subjects choose the so-called “irrational” response. If the
logical inconsistency of their response is pointed out to subjects,
they can quickly give the logically correct response and offer jus-
tiﬁcations for the initial heuristic response (Sloman, 1996). My
conjecture is that instinctual biases are drawn from a very differ-
ent well than the conceptual biases exhibited in the Linda problem.
If this is the case, there is no reason to believe that the theory can
account for the types of reasoning phenomenon of interest here.
One response to this objection is to note that System 1 is a
heterogeneous collection of everything from reﬂex arcs to concep-
tual biases (Stanovich, 2004). In this case, the instinctual biases
I am trying to bring attention to would fall into System 1 (as
would many reason-based processes). Even though it has been
argued elsewhere (Goel, 2008), that the differences in the under-
lying causal mechanisms of such a heterogeneous collection of
System 1 processes makes the category uninteresting for theory
building, the distinction is considered useful because System 1
processes are said to share behavioral similarities in outputs in
terms of speed and automaticity of responses (Stanovich, 2004).
Here I want to suggest that the behavioral patterns are very dif-
ferent in the case of conceptual biases and instinctual biases. The
argument here is similar to that offered above for the massive
modularity account.
The whole point of dual mechanism accounts is that the pro-
cessing goes through one of the two systems. The responses are
either “rational” or “heuristic.” This model works well for the type
of phenomena the theory was intended to explain, such as content
effects in syllogisms (Evans, 2003) and the Linda problem (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983). In each of these cases the conceptual biases
result in a dramatic shift in subject responses, so perhaps one can
argue that the bias results in the queuing of a different system. Fur-
thermore, individuals are consciously aware of and can articulate
the reasons for the “non-rational” response (Sloman, 1996).
In the case of the instinctual biases of interest here, there is
neither a dramatic shift in behavior such that 90% of participants
are responding in one way or the other, nor an awareness of the
reasons for the behavioral shift. Both of these points have been
illustrated with examples in the above discussion of massive mod-
ularity. As in the case of massive modularity, the dual mechanism
accounts work best when there is a dramatic shift in performance
(as in the Linda Problem) but will require some sort of modu-
lation/interaction account where the response shift is graded and
less pronounced, and subjects are unable to fully articulate causally
efﬁcacious reasons for their response/choice.
ADULTERATED RATIONALITY ACCOUNT
I think the key missing feature in the above accounts of human
reasoning is the recognition of the modulation of rational choice
by instinctual biases. Any theory that is going to do justice to
human reasoning must acknowledge both a rational system and a
host of instinctual systems or biases. It must also acknowledge that
these systems interact, to varying degrees, in human reasoning and
decision-making. Human choices cannot be explained by postu-
lating a single type of system, whether it be instinctual modules or
a general-purpose reasoning system.
I am proposing a banal model whereby the rational engine has
evolved on top of instinctual/tropistic mechanisms. The nature
of these instinctive mechanisms can perhaps be understood along
the lines of the “automatic appetitive impulsive processes” postu-
lated in the addiction literature (Gladwin et al., 2011; Wiers et al.,
2013). The instinctual biases of interest here need not be “appet-
itive” processes, but they are automatic, impulsive, non-cognitive
processes that manifest individual differences, and modulate and
in turn are modulated by, top-down (reason-based) executive
control processes. Thus functioning of the rational engine is
modulated or adulterated by these processes to varying degrees,
depending on the nature of the tasks, and individual differ-
ences. For example, the rational engine would be more affected
by instinctual biases in the case of mate selection than in calcu-
lating the launch trajectory of a satellite to orbit Mars. I view
this process of modulation or adulteration as one of bending and
warping the architecture of the reason-based system such that
certain possibilities are facilitated, hindered, or even blocked.
I propose to call this the “adulterated rationality” account of
reasoning.
The system is set up in such away that the unconscious bottom–
up instinctual biases or modules are triggered by task speciﬁc cues
in the environment (along the lines postulated by the massive
modularity account), however, rather than being the sole determi-
nants of behavior, these biases pass through a conscious top-down
reason-based system, resulting in a response that is a blended
product of the two systems. Individual differences in the strength
of speciﬁc bottom-up, non-cognitive, instinctual biases, and the
strength of top-down cognitive, reason-based processes and strate-
gies, alongwith the nature of the reasoning task,will affect the ratio
of the mixture.
For example, consider the discriminative parental solic-
itude effect with which we began. Parental investment is
a valuable resource that can be parasitized by non-relatives
(Daly andWilson, 1994). It is suggested that we all have manda-
tory, automatic, innate mechanisms for countering parental
investment parasitism (Daly and Wilson, 1994). These mech-
anisms must be suppressed in the case of stepfathers (and
stepmothers) where they make the conscious decision to accept
a mate with children from another partner. The majority of
stepfathers and stepmothers are able to bond (to some extent)
with their new mate’s existing offspring, but there is consider-
able individual variability. The standard explanation for failure
would implicate top down inhibition processes (i.e., “they didn’t
try hard enough”). But an equally likely possibility is variabil-
ity in the strength of the mandatory impulsive, non-cognitive,
bottom-up processes. If these instinctual systems are exceptionally
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strong in certain individuals, then an equivalent exertion of top-
down processes will not result in the same effect. This raises
some interesting psychological, biological, ethical, and legal
issues.
CONCLUSION
My goal here has been to draw attention to an ubiquitous, but
neglected phenomenon which affects our rational behavior: the
modulation of conscious rational choice by unconscious instinc-
tual biases. Much of the study of human rationality within
cognitive psychology has focused on logical form. It is time to
look beyond logical form. Recent studies directed at the role of
emotions in logical reasoning are beginning to do this (Blanchette,
2006; Goel andVartanian, 2010). However encouraging, this is not
sufﬁcient.We need to cast a much broader net and incorporate the
type of phenomena identiﬁed here. Failure to do so will result in
incomplete and distorted theories of reasoning. Broadening the
research program means developing experimental paradigms to
study the role of instinctual biases on decision-making and using
these data to inform cognitive theory. I believe that incorporat-
ing these data will point us toward something like an adulterated
rationality account of reasoning.
Furthermore, cognitive psychology has emphasized the impor-
tance of top-down cognitive inhibitory processes in understanding
human behavior. We know something about the neuropsychol-
ogy of these processes (Shallice and Cooper, 2011). However, the
adulterated rationality model, in identifying the importance of
bottom-up, non-cognitive, instinctual processes, and recognizing
individual differences, suggests that this focus is only half of the
story. Deviation of behavior from expected norms may not sim-
ply be a function of failure of top-down control, but individual
differences in the strength of the bottom-up processes. If this is
the case, it would have important consequences for our legal and
social norms and expectations.
Thus in summary, I am drawing attention to ubiquitous,
real-world, reasoning paradigms where rational choice is mod-
ulated by instinctual biases. I argue that existing models of
logical reasoning cannot adequately accommodate these phenom-
ena and propose an adulterated rationality account of reasoning.
The ubiquitousness of the phenomena call for data collection,
model ﬁtting and exploration of consequences for social and legal
norms.
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